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Capital Standards for Banks: 
The Evolving Basel Accord 
This article is adapted from testimony presented by Federal Reserve 
Board Vice Chairman Roger W. Ferguson, Jr., on June 18, 2003, 
before the U.S. Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban 
Affairs and on June 19, 2003, before the U.S. House of Representa-
tives Committee on Financial Services, Subcommittee on Financial 
Institutions and Consumer Credit. The full testimony is available on 
the Board's web site, at www.federalreserve.gov/generalinfo/basel2/ 
speeches.htm. 
The business of banking involves taking and manag-
ing risks. Lending, for example, involves the risk that 
the borrower will not pay back the loan as promised, 
and paying a fixed rate of interest on term deposits 
involves the risk that rates will drop, leaving the bank 
earning less on its investments than it is paying out 
on deposits. Risk is not unique to banking, of course; 
all types of companies engaged in international 
activities, for example, face the risk of unfavorable 
movements in exchange rates. But changes in bank-
ing and financial markets have increased the com-
plexity of banking risks. And the position of banks 
in modern economies has made the management of 
banking risks ever more important to financial stabil-
ity and economic growth. 
In the United States, banks, in addition to their 
economic role in funding households and businesses, 
are central to the credit intermediation and payments 
process and to the conduct of monetary policy. More-
over, they have privileged access to borrowing from 
the Federal Reserve (via the discount window) and 
to federally supported payment systems; in addition, 
the deposits they accept from the public are federally 
insured. 
Because of banks' multiple functions, the great 
degree of leverage they employ in carrying out their 
economic role, and their access to the safety net, 
society has a keen interest in the health and well-
being of the banking system. The level of govern-
ment regulation and supervision, unique to insured 
depository institutions, has evolved over the years. 
As part of the supervisory process, examiners have 
routinely evaluated the overall health of the institu-
tion as well as its risk-management capabilities. In 
the process, they have also assessed bank loan port-
folios and the general integrity of bank financial 
statements. Only in recent decades, however, have 
U.S. banking agencies established specific standards 
for capital in relation to the risk of loss rather than 
simply commenting on institutions' capital adequacy 
to managers and boards of directors on a case-by-
case basis, often in qualitative terms. 
Specific standards were first imposed in 1981, fol-
lowing a period in which already low capital ratios at 
large U.S. banks continued to decline in the face of 
a substantial deterioration in the quality of loan port-
folios due primarily to exposures to emerging econo-
mies. Prompted by the slow response of banks to 
these growing risks, the Federal Reserve and the 
other U.S. banking agencies adopted the "primary 
capital'' standard requiring that banks maintain a 
ratio of capital (essentially equity and loan-loss 
reserves) to total assets of 5.5 percent. 
Later, coordinated international efforts led to the 
more elaborate, though still relatively simple, Basel 
Capital Accord, which sets forth a framework for 
capital adequacy standards for large, internationally 
active banks and serves as the basis for the risk-based 
capital adequacy standards currently in place for all 
U.S. banks and bank holding companies. Now pro-
posals are being considered to refine the current 
framework to take account of changes in banking and 
the banking system over the fifteen years since the 
Basel Capital Accord was adopted. 
THE BASEL CAPITAL ACCORD. 
The Basel Capital Accord, the current international 
framework on capital adequacy, was adopted in 
1988 by a group of central banks and other national 
supervisory authorities, working through the Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision. 
[note: 1]. The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, established in 
1974, is made up of representatives of the central banks or other 
supervisory authorities of Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, 
Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the 
United Kingdom, and the United States. The committee, which meets, 
and has its secretariat, at the Bank for International Settlements in 
Basel, Switzerland, has no formal authority. Rather, it works to 
develop broad supervisory standards and promote best practices, in 
the expectation that each country will implement the standards in 
ways most appropriate to its circumstances. Agreements are devel-oped by consensus, but decisions about which parts of the agreements 
to implement and how to implement them are left to each nation's 
regulatory authorities. 
The 1988 Basel Capital Accord and its amendments are avail-
able on the web site of the Bank for International Settlements, at 
www.bis.org/publ/bcbs04a.htm. [end of note.] 
The accord's fundamental objectives are to promote the 
soundness and stability of the international banking system 
and to provide an equitable basis for international compe-
tition among banks. Although it was intended specifi-
cally for internationally active banks, the accord has, 
in practice, been applied beyond the largest institu-
tions to cover most banking organizations worldwide. 
The accord sets forth a framework for measur-
ing capital adequacy and a minimum standard to be 
achieved by international banks in adopting coun-
tries. The original framework assessed capital mainly 
in relation to credit risk (the risk of loss due to the 
failure of a counterparty to meet its obligations) and 
addressed other risks only implicity, effectively load-
ing all regulatory capital requirements on measures 
of credit risk. In 1996 it was amended to take explicit 
account of market risk in trading accounts (the risk of 
loss due to a change in market prices, such as equity 
prices or interest or exchange rates). 
Stated simply, the Basel Capital Accord requires 
that a bank have available as ''regulatory capital'' 
(through combinations of equity, loan-loss reserves, 
subordinated debt, and other accepted instruments) at 
least 8 percent of the value of its risk-weighted assets 
(loans and securities, for example) and asset-
equivalent off-balance-sheet exposures (such as loan 
commitments, standby letters of credit, and obliga-
tions on derivatives contracts). For purposes of deter-
mining a bank's assets, different types of assets are 
weighted according to the level of perceived risk that 
each type represents, and each off-balance-sheet 
exposure is converted to its equivalent amount of 
assets and weighted as that type of asset would 
be weighted. For example, commercial loans are 
weighted at 100 percent, whereas loans on residential 
housing, considered less risky, are weighted at 50 per-
cent. 
[note: 2]. As implemented in the United States, there are four risk 
weights—0, 20, 50, and 100 percent—applied to various risk 
categories. [end of note.] 
Total risk-weighted assets are multiplied by 
8 percent to determine the bank's minimum capital 
requirement. 
A bank's capital ratio—its regulatory capital as a 
proportion of its risk-weighted assets—and whether 
that ratio meets or exceeds the 8 percent minimum 
have become important indicators of the institution's 
financial strength. The definition of capital has 
evolved over the years in response to financial inno-
vation. The definition of assets has also changed to 
address financial innovation, both on and off balance 
sheet. Although the framework sets forth many 
details, it allows national supervisors a degree of 
discretion in adopting the standard to its specific 
institutions and markets. 
NEED FOR A NEW CAPITAL STANDARD. 
The Basel Capital Accord, now familiarly known as 
Basel I, is widely viewed as having achieved its 
principal objectives of promoting financial stability 
and providing an equitable basis for competition 
among internationally active banks. At the same time, 
it is also seen as having outlived its usefulness, at 
least in relation to larger banking organizations. From 
the perspective of U.S. supervisors, Basel I needs to 
be replaced, at least for the largest, most complex 
banks, for three major reasons: It has serious short-
comings as it applies to these large entities; the art of 
risk management has evolved at the largest banks; 
and the banking system has become increasingly 
concentrated. 
Shortcomings of Basel I. 
Basel I was a major step forward in capital regula-
tion. Indeed, for most banks in this country Basel I, 
as it has been augmented by U.S. supervisors, is 
now—and for the foreseeable future will be—more 
than adequate as a capital framework. It is too simple, 
however, to address the activities of the most com-
plex banking organizations. As implemented in the 
United States, it specifies only four levels of risk, 
even though loans assigned the same risk weight (for 
example, 100 percent for commercial loans) can vary 
greatly in credit quality. The limited differentiation 
among degrees of risk means that calculated capital 
ratios are often uninformative and may provide mis-
leading information about a bank's capital adequacy 
relative to its risks. 
The limited differentiation among degrees of risk 
also creates incentives for banks to ''game'' the sys-
tem through regulatory capital arbitrage by selling, 
securitizing, or otherwise avoiding exposures for 
which the regulatory capital requirement is higher 
than the market requires and pursuing those for which 
the requirement is lower than the market would apply 
to that asset, say, in the economic enhancement nec-
essary to securitize the asset. Credit card loans and 
residential mortgages are types of assets that banks 
securitize in large volumes because they believe 
required regulatory capital to be more than market or economic capital. 
[note: 3]. Economic capital is a bank's internal estimate of the capital 
needed to support its risk-taking activities. [end of note.] 
Such capital arbitrage of the regu-
latory requirements by banks is perfectly understand-
able, and in some respects even desirable in terms of 
economic efficiency. Because, of course, banks retain 
those assets for which the regulatory capital require-
ment is less than the market would apply, large banks 
engaging in capital arbitrage may, as a result, hold 
too little capital for the assets they retain, even though 
they meet the letter of the Basel I rules. 
Although U.S. supervisors are still able to evaluate 
the true risk position of a bank through the examina-
tion process, the regulatory minimum capital ratios of 
the larger banks are, as a result of capital arbitrage, 
becoming less meaningful. Not only are creditors, 
counterparties, and investors hampered in evaluat-
ing the capital strength of individual banks from the 
ratios as currently calculated, but regulations and 
statutory requirements tied to those ratios have less 
meaning as well. For the larger banks, in short, 
Basel I capital ratios neither reflect risk adequately 
nor measure bank strength accurately. 
Evolution of the Art 
of Risk Measurement and Management. 
Risk measurement and management have improved 
significantly beyond the state of the art of fifteen 
years ago, when Basel I was developed. Banks them-
selves have led the development of new techniques to 
improve their risk management and internal eco-
nomic capital measures in order to be more effective 
competitors and to control and manage their credit 
losses. But clearly they can go considerably further. 
A revised accord that is carefully crafted could speed 
adoption of still better techniques and promote the 
further evolution of risk measurement and manage-
ment by spurring increased investment in the process. 
Continuing Concentration 
of the Banking Industry. 
Market pressures have led to consolidation in bank-
ing around the world. The U.S. banking system has 
been part of this trend; it, too, has become increas-
ingly concentrated, with a small number of very large 
banks operating across a wide range of product and 
geographic markets. The operations of these large 
banks are tremendously complex and sophisticated, 
and these banks have markedly different product 
mixes. At the same time, a significant weakness in 
any one of these entities could have severely adverse 
macroeconomic consequences. Although the share of 
insured liabilities to total funding has declined over 
time, these banks, with their scale and role in pay-
ment and settlement systems and in derivatives mar-
kets, have presented authorities with greater moral 
hazard. The regulatory framework should encourage 
these banks to adopt the best possible risk measure-
ment and management techniques while allowing for 
the considerable differences in their business strate-
gies. A modified accord could encourage these and 
other large banks to push their management frontier 
forward. 
BASEL II. 
Over the past several years, the Basel Committee 
on Banking Supervision has been working on a new 
accord to reflect changes in the structure and prac-
tices of banking and financial markets. The most 
recent version of the proposed New Basel Capital 
Accord, now known as Basel II, was released in a 
consultative paper in April 2003. 
[note: 4]. The full document, titled ''The New Basel Capital Accord,'' as 
well as an overview, is available at www.bis.org/bcbs/bcbscp3.htm. [end of note.] 
The focus of the 
reform has been on strengthening the regulatory capi-
tal framework for large, internationally active bank-
ing organizations through minimum capital require-
ments that are more sensitive to an institution's risk 
profile and that reinforce incentives for strong risk 
management. 
The proposed substitute for the current capital 
accord is more complex than its predecessor, for 
several reasons. One reason is that the assessment 
of risk in an environment of a growing number of 
financial instruments and strategies having subtle dif-
ferences in risk-reward characteristics is inevitably 
complicated. Another is that the reform effort has 
multiple objectives: 
• To improve risk measurement and management 
• To link, to the extent possible, the amount of 
required capital to the amount of risk taken 
• To further focus the supervisor-bank dialogue on 
the measurement and management of risk and the 
connection between risk and capital 
• To increase the transparency of bank risk-taking 
to the customers and counterparties that ultimately 
fund—and hence share—these risk positions. Proposed changes to elements of the capital ratio under Basel II, diagram 
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Overview. 
The Basel II framework is built on three mutually 
reinforcing elements, or ''pillars'': 
• Pillar 1 addresses minimum capital require-
ments—the rules by which a bank calculates its capi-
tal ratio and its supervisor assesses whether it is in 
compliance with the minimum capital threshold. The 
concept of the capital ratio would remain unchanged. 
As under Basel I, the numerator of the ratio would be 
an amount representing the capital available to the 
bank (its regulatory capital) and the denominator 
would be an amount representing the risks faced 
by the bank (its risk-weighted assets). As proposed, 
the minimum required capital ratio (8 percent) and 
the definition of regulatory capital (certain equity, 
reserves, and subordinated debt) would not change 
from Basel I. 
[note: 5]. However, the definition of regulatory capital under Basel II 
remains under consideration by the Basel Committee. Capital cur-
rently includes allowances for loan and lease losses, which are 
reserves for yet-unidentified, but expected, loan losses. However, 
most models used by banks themselves to measure their economic 
risks focus only on unexpected losses and, as a result, would exclude 
such reserves when evaluating capital adequacy. [end of note.] 
What would change is the definition of 
risk-weighted assets—the methods used to measure 
the riskiness of the loans and investments held by the 
bank. Specifically, Basel II would make substantive 
changes in the treatment of credit risk and would 
provide for specific treatment of securitization, a 
risk-management technique not fully contemplated 
by Basel I. And it would explicitly take account of 
operational risk—the risk of loss resulting from inade-
quate or failed internal processes, people, or systems 
or from external events. This modified definition of 
risk-weighted assets, with its greater sensitivity to 
risk, is the hallmark of Basel II. (See diagram.) 
• Pillar 2 addresses supervisory oversight. It 
encompasses the concept that well-managed banks 
should seek to go beyond simple compliance with 
minimum capital requirements and perform for them-
selves a comprehensive assessment of whether they 
have sufficient capital to support their own individual 
risk profile. It also promotes the notion that super-
visors, on the basis of their knowledge of industry 
practices at a range of institutions, should provide 
constructive feedback to bank management on their 
internal assessments. (In the United States, pillar 2 is 
largely already encompassed in the supervisory pro-
cess, but it would represent a significant change in 
supervision in some other countries.) 
• Pillar 3 seeks to complement these activities with 
stronger market discipline by requiring banks to pub-
licly disclose key information that enables market 
participants to assess an individual bank's risk profile 
and level of capitalization. This pillar is seen as 
particularly important because some banks under 
Basel II would be allowed to rely more heavily on 
internal methods for determining risk, giving them 
greater discretion in determining their capital needs. 
Options for Application. 
In contrast to Basel I, which applies the same frame-
work to all covered banks, Basel II, as currently 
proposed, offers three options for measuring credit risk and three for measuring operational risk. The 
purpose of offering options is to allow each bank and 
its supervisors to select approaches that are most 
appropriate to the bank's operations and its ability to 
measure risk. 
Credit Risk. 
The options for calculating credit risk are the stan-
dardized approach and two internal-ratings-based 
(IRB) approaches—the foundation approach and the 
advanced approach. The standardized approach is 
similar to the current framework in that bank assets 
are categorized and then weighted according to fixed 
risk weights for the various categories specified by 
supervisors. However, the standardized approach 
adds more risk categories and makes use of external 
credit ratings to evaluate corporate risk exposures. 
Under the two IRB approaches, each bank would 
evaluate its assets in terms of the most important 
elements of credit risk—the probability that a bor-
rower will default during a given period, the likely 
size of the loss should default occur, the amount of 
exposure at the time of default, and the remaining 
maturity of the exposure. Risk weights, and thus 
capital requirements, would be determined by a com-
bination of bank-provided quantitative inputs and 
supervisor-provided formulas. 
The details for calculating capital charges would 
vary somewhat according to type of exposure (corpo-
rate or retail, for example). The difference between 
the two IRB approaches is that the foundation ap-
proach would require the bank to determine only 
each loan's probability of default, and the supervisor 
would provide the other risk inputs; under the 
advanced approach, the bank would determine all the 
risk inputs, under procedures validated by the super-
visor. Banks choosing to operate under either of the 
two IRB approaches would be required to meet mini-
mum qualifying criteria pertaining to the compre-
hensiveness and integrity of their internal capabilities 
for assessing the risk inputs relevant for its approach. 
Operational Risk. 
The three proposed options for calculating opera-
tional risk are the basic indicator approach, the stan-
dardized approach, and the advanced measurement 
approaches (AMA). The basic indicator and standard-
ized approaches are intended for banks having rela-
tively less significant exposure to operational risk. 
They require that banks hold capital against opera-
tional risk in an amount equal to a specified percent-
age of the bank's average annual gross income over 
the preceding three years. Under the basic indicator 
approach, the capital requirement would be cal-
culated at the firm level; under the standardized 
approach, a separate capital requirement would have 
to be calculated for each of eight designated business 
lines. Banks using these two approaches would not 
be allowed to take into account the risk-mitigating 
effect of insurance. 
The AMA option is designed to be more sensitive 
to operational risk and is intended for internationally 
active banks having significant exposure to opera-
tional risk. It seeks to build on banks' rapidly devel-
oping internal assessment techniques and would 
allow banks to use their own methods for assessing 
their exposure, so long as those methods are judged 
by supervisors to be sufficiently comprehensive and 
systematic. 
Internationally active banks and banks having 
significant exposure to operational risk would be 
expected to adopt the more risk sensitive AMA 
option over time. No specific criteria for using the 
basic indicator approach would be set forth, but 
banks using that approach would be encouraged to 
comply with supervisory guidance on sound practices 
for managing and supervising operational risk. Banks 
using either the standardized approach or the AMA 
approach would be required to have operational risk 
systems meeting certain criteria, with the criteria for 
the AMA being more rigorous. 
IMPLEMENTATION OF BASEL II 
IN THE UNITED STATES. 
Like its predecessor, the proposed New Basel Capital 
Accord provides a framework for ensuring that banks 
hold adequate capital against risk. National discretion 
is built into the framework so that adopting countries 
have some flexibility in implementing rules that are 
most appropriate to their own circumstances. The 
U.S. banking agencies have been closely coordinating 
their efforts to implement a new accord in this coun-
try. While their current proposal differs in some 
respects from the Basel Committee's proposal, those 
differences lie mainly in the scope of application 
rather than in the details for calculating capital 
charges. 
[note: 6]. The U.S. banking agencies are the Board of Governors of the 
Federal Reserve System, the Office of the Comptroller of the Cur-
rency, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, and the Office of 
Thrift Supervision. 
The current proposal for implementation in the United States is 
contained in an interagency advance notice of proposed rulemaking, published in the Federal Register on August 4, 2003 (vol. 68, no. 149, 
pp. 45899-948). Draft supervisory guidance on internal-ratings-based 
systems for accounting for corporate credit and on advanced measure-
ment approaches to accounting for operational risk, with request 
for comment, was published in the Federal Register on the same date 
(pp. 45949-988). [end of note.] 
Scope of Application. 
The U.S. banking agencies have proposed that large, 
internationally active banking organizations be 
treated differently from most other banks because of 
the complexity and scale of their operations and 
transactions and their greater ability and need to 
quantify risks. 
Most U.S. Banks. 
The agencies have proposed that most banking orga-
nizations in this country not be required to adopt 
Basel II, although they may do so if they wish 
provided that they demonstrate the ability to develop 
the necessary risk measures required as inputs to 
determine capital requirements. Those banks not 
adopting Basel II would remain under the existing 
(Basel I) capital rule, which entails no explicit capital 
charge for operational risk. The agencies have several 
reasons for believing that most U.S. banks should not 
be required to apply new rules: 
• Most U.S. banks have relatively straightforward 
balance sheets and do not yet need to employ the full 
range of sophisticated risk-management techniques 
required under the advanced versions of Basel II. 
• Most U.S. banks already hold considerable capi-
tal in excess of the Basel I regulatory minimum, in 
part to meet existing U.S. regulatory criteria for being 
considered "well capitalized.'' According to regula-
tory reports, more than 98 percent of these organi-
zations have risk-weighted capital ratios in excess 
of 10 percent, well above the Basel I minimum of 
8 percent. Applying new standards to them would 
likely have little effect in requiring them to hold 
additional capital, but would require the adoption of 
expensive new procedures, and thus does not seem 
worthwhile. 
• U.S. banks have long been subject to compre-
hensive and thorough supervision, including a review 
of their risk-measurement and risk-management pro-
cesses. They also disclose considerable information 
through regulatory reports and, if they are issuers of 
public debt or equity, under accounting rules and 
requirements of the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission; consistent with pillar 3 of Basel II, they 
already provide significant disclosure. 
When the costs of imposing a new capital regime 
on thousands of U.S. banks are balanced against the 
benefits—slightly more risk sensitivity of capital 
requirements under, say, the standardized version 
of Basel II for credit risk and somewhat more 
disclosure—requiring most U.S. banks to make the 
change to Basel II does not seem worthwhile. Coun-
tries whose institutional structure differs from that in 
the United States might find universal application of 
Basel II to benefit their banking system, but in the 
United States this approach seems neither necessary 
nor practical. 
Large, Complex Banking Organizations. 
The agencies have proposed that the largest, most 
complicated banking organizations—those with total 
assets of at least $250 billion or total foreign expo-
sure of at least $10 billion—be required to adopt 
the advanced versions of Basel II—the advanced 
internal-ratings-based (A-IRB) approach for mea-
suring credit risk and the advanced measure-
ment approaches (AMA) for measuring operational 
risk. U.S. supervisors believe that these advanced 
approaches are best suited to the objective of encour-
aging the largest U.S. banking organizations to con-
tinue to incorporate into their operations the most 
sophisticated techniques for the measurement and 
management of risk. As noted earlier, these entities 
use financial instruments and procedures that are not 
adequately captured by the Basel I paradigm. They 
have already begun to use—or have the ability to 
adopt—the techniques of modern finance to measure 
and manage their exposures. Moreover, substantial 
difficulty at one of the largest banking organizations 
could have significant effects on global financial mar-
kets. Consequently, the U.S. banking agencies believe 
that all the largest banks worldwide should be using 
these more advanced risk measurement and manage-
ment procedures. 
Under the advanced approach for measuring credit 
risk, a banking organization would be required to 
estimate, for each credit exposure, the probability 
of borrower default, the likely size of the loss in the 
event of default, and the likely amount of exposure at 
the time of default. These three probabilities, together 
with the effective remaining maturity of the expo-
sure, would be used as key inputs in formulas 
provided by supervisors to determine the minimum 
required capital for a given portfolio of exposures. 
Although the bank would estimate these key inputs, 
the estimates would have to be based on empirical 
information, using procedures and controls validated by the bank's supervisor, and the results would have 
to measure risk accurately. 
U.S. banks that adopt the advanced approach to 
measuring credit risk would be required to hold capi-
tal against operational risk pursuant to the AMA 
option. Accordingly, banks themselves would bear 
the primary responsibility for developing their own 
methodology for determining their operational risk 
capital requirement. Supervisors would require that 
the procedures used be comprehensive, systematic, 
and consistent with certain broad outlines and would 
review and validate each bank's process. In this way, 
a bank's capital charge for operational risk would 
reflect its own environment and controls. The ability 
of a bank to lower the amount of its capital charge by 
taking actions to limit its potential losses from opera-
tional problems is an important incentive provided 
by this approach. Under the AMA, there would be no 
quantitative regulatory mimimum capital for opera-
tional risk, either absolutely or relative to total capi-
tal; the amount required would vary from bank to 
bank. 
At present, about ten U.S. banks—termed ''core'' 
banks—have total assets or total foreign exposure 
above the specified amounts and therefore would be 
required, under the current proposal, to adopt the 
advanced approaches to measuring credit and opera-
tional risks. In the years ahead, it is possible that 
other banks, as they grow, may meet the criteria and 
thus shift into the core group. 
In addition, as noted, other banks that can meet the 
requirements of the advanced approaches to quan-
tify various aspects of credit risk exposures and to 
develop systems for measuring operational risk expo-
sures would be allowed to adopt these approaches if 
they so chose. Relevant considerations for banks in 
deciding whether to pursue the advanced approaches 
include the benefits of doing so relative to the costs, 
the nature of their operations, the effect on their 
capital requirement, and the message they want to 
send to their counterparties about their risk-
management techniques. It is estimated that in the 
near term, perhaps ten or more large U.S. banks now 
outside the core set (termed ''opt in'' banks) would 
choose to adopt Basel II. Thus, if Basel II were 
applied today, about twenty U.S. banks would likely 
adopt the advanced versions of Basel II. 
Over time, other large banks, perhaps responding 
to market pressure and facing declining costs—and 
wider understanding—of the technology, might also 
choose the advanced capital regime. The agencies 
believe, however, that it would be some time before 
a cost-benefit assessment would induce smaller and 
less complex banks to do so. The decision for many 
banks may rest on market reactions to their initial 
view. Discussions with the rating agencies confirm 
that they do not expect many banks outside the core 
group to find adoption of Basel II to be cost effective 
during the initial implementation period, and prelimi-
nary surveys of bank equity security analysts indicate 
that they are more focused on the disclosure aspects 
of Basel II than on the scope of application. This 
would suggest little market pressure on non-core 
banks to adopt the advanced approaches. For their 
part, U.S. supervisors have no intention of pressuring 
other banks to adopt Basel II, at least in the early 
years. As risk-measurement standards evolve and 
become more widespread, supervisors might expect 
more banks to use advanced measures. The point, as 
always, is that risk management and capital standards 
should keep pace with banking practice and that all 
banks should be well managed. 
The ten core banks, together with the estimated ten 
self-selecting banks, currently account for 99 per-
cent of the foreign assets, and more than 65 percent 
of total assets, held by U.S. banking organizations. 
These figures indicate the importance of these entities 
to the U.S. and global banking and financial markets. 
In turn, the proposal to require Basel II for just 
these entities, were the new accord applied today, 
underscores the United States' commitment to foster-
ing international competitive equity and the adop-
tion of best-practice policies at the organizations 
critical to financial stability while minimizing cost 
and disruption at purely domestic, less-complicated 
organizations. 
Issues in Implementation. 
Three key areas of concern relating to the current 
proposal for implementing Basel II in the United 
States have been identified: the cost of implementa-
tion, competitive equity, and the treatment of opera-
tional risk. 
Cost of Implementation. 
Implementing the advanced approaches for measur-
ing credit and operational risk in the United States 
would be expensive for the small number of banks 
required to do so, for other banks choosing to do so, 
and for supervisors. For banks, the greatest expense 
would be in establishing the mechanisms necessary 
to evaluate and control risk exposures more formally 
than in the past. The A-IRB approach would not 
eliminate losses: Banks are in the business of taking risk, and where there are risks, there will be losses. 
But U.S. supervisors believe that the better risk man-
agement that would be required under the advanced 
approaches would better align risk and return and 
thereby provide benefits to bank stakeholders and the 
economy. And the more-risk-sensitive capital require-
ments would help ensure that banks have sufficient 
capital to absorb losses when they do occur. 
Moreover, not all the costs associated with the 
adoption of modern, formal risk-management sys-
tems should be attributed to Basel II. The large banks 
that would be required, or would choose, to adopt the 
advanced approaches have already adopted many 
risk-management processes, in their need to compete 
for funding in a global marketplace, and would con-
tinue to develop them even without Basel II. The 
current proposal might speed the adoption process, 
but, overall, the costs of adopting these processes are 
being forced on these banks not by Basel II but by the 
requirements of doing business in an increasingly 
complex financial environment. 
Competitive Equity. 
A second key concern in implementation, as cur-
rently proposed, is competitive equity, in three areas. 
Equity in Application. Some U.S. banks that would be 
subject to Basel II have expressed concern that U.S. 
supervisors might be more stringent in their applica-
tion of Basel II rules than the supervisors in other 
countries, thereby placing U.S. banks at a competitive 
disadvantage. To address the concern about unequal 
application, the Basel Committee has established an 
Accord Implementation Group made up of senior 
supervisors from each Basel Committee member 
country to work out common standards and proce-
dures and to serve as a forum in which conflicts can 
be addressed. No doubt some differences in applica-
tion would be unavoidable across banking systems 
having different institutional and supervisory struc-
tures, but supervisors would remain alert to the poten-
tial problem and work to minimize it. Moreover, as 
is the case today, U.S. bank subsidiaries of foreign 
banks would be operating under U.S. rules, just as 
foreign bank subsidiaries of U.S. banks would be 
operating under host-country rules. 
Equity of Effects on Minimum Capital Requirements. 
The proposed changes in calculating capital require-
ments under the advanced versions of Basel II could 
have the result of lowering some banks' minimum 
capital requirements, and raising other banks' mini-
mum requirements, relative to the amounts that 
would have been required under Basel I. Some 
observers have expressed concern about the competi-
tive edge that might be gained by a bank having its 
capital requirement lowered by more than that of 
another Basel II bank. 
The essence of Basel II is that it is designed to link 
the capital requirement to the risk resulting from the 
exposures at each individual bank. A bank that holds 
mainly lower-risk assets, such as high-quality resi-
dential mortgages, would have no advantage over a 
rival that held mainly lower quality, and therefore 
riskier, commercial loans just because the former had 
a lower capital requirement. The minimum capital 
requirement should be a function of risk taken, and 
under Basel II, two banks that have similar loans 
should have similar capital requirements. Under 
Basel I, the regulatory capital requirement does not 
always fully reflect the risk taken. Because Basel II is 
more risk-sensitive, it should not have much of an 
effect on competitive equity. If anything, one could 
argue, it will reduce competitive distortions. How-
ever, supervisors are mindful of the concerns sur-
rounding possible competitive distortions created by 
Basel II and therefore are analyzing evidence and 
evaluating the potential effects that Basel II might 
have. 
Equity under a Bifurcated Scheme. The most fre-
quently voiced concern about possible competitive 
imbalance relates to the ''bifurcated'' rules implicit in 
the proposed scope of application—that is, requiring 
Basel II, through the advanced approaches, for a 
small number of large banks while requiring the 
current capital rules for all other U.S. banks. The 
concern is that the banks remaining under the current 
capital rules, with capital charges that are not as risk 
sensitive, would be at a competitive disadvantage 
relative to Basel II banks, which would have lower 
capital charges on less-risky assets. 
While it is true that the same credit exposure might 
receive a lower minimum capital charge at a Basel II 
bank than at a Basel I bank, it can also be argued that 
a Basel II bank would have higher capital charges 
on higher-risk assets, plus the cost of developing 
and maintaining the information systems and risk-
measurement processes required by Basel II. None-
theless, concerns remain about competitive equity 
under the proposed scope of application. Making 
changes to the U.S. proposal to address these con-
cerns would involve making some difficult trade-offs. 
On the one hand is the pressing need to reform the 
capital system for the largest banks and the practical 
arguments for retaining the current system for most U.S. banks. On the other hand is the concern that the 
current proposal might have the unintended conse-
quence of disadvantaging those banks remaining 
under the current capital regime. Although there are 
reasons to believe that little if any competitive disad-
vantage would fall on those banks remaining under 
the current regime, the matter is taken seriously and 
will be explored before final decisions are made. 
The basic question is the role of minimum regula-
tory capital requirements in banks' determination of 
the price and availability of the credit they extend. 
Economic analysis suggests that currently imprecise 
and nonbinding regulatory capital should be consider-
ably less important to banks in their decisionmaking 
than their own calculations of risk and the capital 
allocations they make within their organization to 
individual exposures, portfolios, and business lines— 
their internal economic capital measures. Sound bank 
pricing is based on an explicit estimate of the riski-
ness of the credit, market conditions, and competitive 
factors. In most cases, regulatory capital is largely 
irrelevant in the pricing decision and is therefore 
unlikely to cause competitive disparities. 
Moreover, most banks, especially smaller ones, 
currently hold capital far in excess of regulatory 
minimums, for various reasons. Thus, changes in 
their own or their rivals' minimum regulatory capital 
requirement generally would not have much effect on 
the level of capital they choose to hold and would 
therefore not necessarily affect internal capital alloca-
tions for pricing purposes. 
In addition, small banks have for years faced capi-
tal arbitrage from larger rivals that are able to reduce 
their capital charges by securitizing loans for which 
the regulatory requirements are high relative to what 
the market would require based on the perceived 
level of economic risks. The more-risk-sensitive 
advanced approach would, in fact, reduce the regula-
tory capital charge in just those areas in which capital 
requirements are too high under the current regime. 
Indeed, capital arbitrage has done much of that 
already. The advanced approach would provide, in 
effect, risk-sensitive capital charges for lower-risk 
assets that are similar to the charges that larger banks 
have for years already obtained through capital arbi-
trage. In short, competitive realities between banks 
might not change in many markets in which mini-
mum regulatory capital charges would become more 
explicitly risk sensitive. 
Concerns have also been raised about the effect of 
the proposed Basel II capital requirements on the 
competitive relationships between depository and 
nondepository institutions. The argument that eco-
nomic capital is the driving force in pricing applies in 
this case, too. The role of economic capital is only 
reinforced by the fact that the cost of capital and 
funding is less at insured depositories than at their 
nondepository rivals because of the safety net pro-
vided by federal deposit insurance. Insured deposits 
and access to the Federal Reserve discount window 
(and Federal Home Loan Bank advances) let insured 
depositories operate with far less capital or collateral-
ization than the market would otherwise require of 
them—and far less than it requires of nondepository 
rivals. Again, Basel II would not change those market 
realities. 
Treatment of Operational Risk. 
The third key area of concern about the U.S. proposal 
for implementing Basel II is the proposed treatment 
of operational risk. Operational risk—and requiring 
that capital be held to offset it—are not new concepts. 
Supervisors have been expecting banks to manage 
operational risk for some time, and banks have long 
been holding capital against it. Under Basel I, both 
operational and credit risks are covered in a single 
measure of risk and a single capital charge. Basel II 
would require explicit and separate charges for the 
two. 
Operational disruptions have caused banks here 
and abroad to suffer huge losses and, in some cases, 
failure. 
[note: 7]. See ''Large Losses from Operational Risk, 1992-2002,'' appen-
dix 2 in June 19, 2003, testimony (www.federalreserve.gov/ 
boarddocs/testimony/2003/20030619/attachment2.pdf). [end of note.] 
In an increasingly technology-driven bank-
ing system, operational risk has become an even 
larger share of total risk; at some banks it is the 
dominant type of risk. Not addressing operational 
risk would be imprudent and would leave a consider-
able gap in the regulatory system. 
Still being considered is the way operational risk 
should be treated—as an explicit capital charge under 
pillar 1 or on a case-by-case basis under pillar 2. 
Under the current U.S. scope of application proposal, 
it would be treated as an explicit charge under pillar 1 
for A-IRB banks, and these banks would be obligated 
to evaluate their own operational risks in a structured, 
though flexible, way. An A-IRB bank could reduce 
its operational risk charge by adopting procedures, 
systems, and controls that reduce its risk or by shift-
ing the risk to other entities through such measures as 
insurance. This approach parallels the way in which a 
bank could reduce its credit risk charge by shifting to 
less-risky exposures or by making use of risk-
mitigation techniques such as requiring collateral or 
guarantees. Those banks for which operational risk is the domi-
nant risk would have significant required capital 
charges should operational risk be explicitly treated 
under pillar 1. Such banks already hold significant 
economic capital for operational risk—in part to meet 
market demands. Thus, adoption of the proposal 
would shift their ''excess'' regulatory capital—capital 
held in excess of current regulatory minimums under 
Basel I—to required regulatory capital under Basel II 
without changing their total capital position much, if 
at all. 
An alternative is to handle operational risk case by 
case through the supervisory review of buffer capital 
under pillar 2. There is concern, however, that doing 
so would greatly reduce the transparency of risk and 
capital that is an important part of Basel II. Also, 
because pillar 2 treatment would be based on supervi-
sory judgment, comparable treatment of risks across 
banks would be very difficult. Work done thus far by 
U.S. banks that would be subject to Basel II indicates 
that an explicit charge could induce banks to adopt 
risk-reducing innovations and encourage them to de-
velop improved operational risk management. None-
theless, this matter, like the other areas of concern, 
will be considered further before final decisions are 
made. 
SUPERVISORY CONSIDERATIONS. 
Some observers have expressed concern that the com-
bined credit and operational risk capital charges 
for U.S. banks subject to Basel II would decline too 
much for prudent supervisory purposes. In exploring 
this possibility, authorities have conducted a series of 
surveys to estimate the likely effect of the proposed 
requirements on banks' regulatory capital. In these 
'' quantitative impact studies,'' banks throughout the 
world have followed the proposed methods of esti-
mating their likely regulatory capital charges for dis-
tinct types of exposures, and survey results have led 
to adjustments to the proposal. 
[note: 8]. The most recent survey (QIS 3) gathered information from more 
than 20 U.S. banks and 365 others around the world. For more 
information about the surveys, see www.bis.org/bcbs/qis/index.htm. [end of note.] 
In the United States, 
at least one additional survey will be conducted 
before final decisions are made and final rules are 
issued. 
As a further precaution, the current proposal for 
Basel II calls for one year of parallel (Basel I and II) 
capital calculation and a two-year phase-in period, 
with capital minimums for the two years set at 90 per-
cent and 80 percent of the Basel I levels respec-
tively. If the evidence at any of those stages sug-
gested that aggregate capital was declining too much, 
the Federal Reserve Board—as well as the other 
agencies—would insist that Basel II be adjusted or 
recalibrated. 
That said, some reduction in minimum regulatory 
capital for sound, well-managed banks having rela-
tively low risk portfolios should be expected and, 
indeed, is intended. Improved risk measurement 
and management, when coupled with such existing 
U.S. supervisory measures as prompt corrective 
action, minimum leverage ratios, statutory provisions 
making capital a prerequisite to exercising additional 
powers, and market demands for buffer capital, 
should result in lower risk profiles—and, as a matter 
of sound public policy, banks with lower risk pro-
files should be allowed to hold less regulatory capital 
than banks with higher risk profiles. Greater disper-
sion in required capital, if reflective of underlying 
risk, is an objective, not a problem to be overcome. 
A final consideration in relation to capital is change 
over time in technology and procedures. Basel II is 
designed to adapt to such changes. In the years ahead, 
banks and supervisors will no doubt develop better 
ways of estimating risk parameters as well as better 
functions that convert those parameters to capital 
requirements. When they do, the changes could be 
substituted directly into the Basel II framework, port-
folio by portfolio if necessary. Basel II would not 
lock risk management into any particular structure; 
rather, it could evolve as best practice evolves. 
LOOKING AHEAD TO ADOPTION. 
Reform of the current Basel Capital Accord and 
development of U.S. rules implementing a new 
accord are ongoing and interrelated. The current pro-
posal for the new accord, issued in April 2003, was 
preceded by several earlier drafts. Each draft has 
been accompanied by documents providing back-
ground on the concepts, framework, and options and 
has been followed by written public comments and 
meetings with bankers in Basel and in other nations, 
including the United States. After each draft, consid-
eration of public comment and analysis of the results 
of the quantitative impact studies have led to signifi-
cant refinement and improvement of the proposal. 
Similarly, the U.S. banking agencies have held 
meetings with bankers, including those whose insti-
tutions would not be required to adopt Basel II but 
might have an interest in choosing to adopt the 
advanced approaches, to ensure that they understand 
the proposal and the options it provides them. And white papers have been issued to help commenters 
frame their views on aspects of the U.S. proposal. 
[note: 9]. These white papers and many other documents related to Basel II 
are available on the Board's web site. See www.federalreserve.gov/ 
generalinfo/basel2/default.htm. [end of note.] 
The dialogue with bankers has had a substantive 
influence on the shape and details of the proposals— 
for example, on the mechanism for establishing capi-
tal for credit risk, the way capital for operational risk 
may be calculated, and the nature of disclosure rules. 
Supervisors also remain open to changes that would 
simplify the proposal but attain its objectives. 
The ninety-day period for comments on the current 
Basel Committee proposal for the new international 
accord ended on July 31, 2003, and the ninety-day 
comment period for the advance notice of proposed 
rulemaking (ANPR) for implementation in the United 
States will end on November 3, 2003. Comments on 
the ANPR will highlight the need for further modifi-
cations. After reviewing the comments, U.S. banking 
agencies will develop a national position to present at 
a meeting of the Basel Committee to resolve remain-
ing differences, now scheduled for late 2003. The 
mechanics of review of the U.S. ANPR make it 
unlikely that the U.S. agencies will be in a position to 
sign off on a final document by then, and the schedule 
is likely to slip into early 2004. The Basel Commit-
tee's goal is implementation in member countries by 
the end of 2006. 
Implementation in the United States of the final 
Basel II agreement would require that the U.S. bank-
ing agencies issue a formal notice of proposed rule-
making, review comments on that proposal, and then 
issue a final rule. On a parallel track, core banks and 
potential opt-in banks in the United States will be 
having preliminary discussions with their supervisors 
to develop a work plan and schedule. As noted ear-
lier, at least one additional quantitative impact study 
will be conducted, starting in 2004, so that U.S. 
supervisors can be more certain of the impact of the 
proposed changes on individual banks and the bank-
ing system. 
As currently planned, core and opt-in banks will be 
asked by late 2004 to develop an action plan leading 
up to final implementation. In keeping with the 
Basel II timeline, bank implementation by the end of 
2006 would be desirable. However, each bank's plan 
will be based on a joint assessment by the bank and 
its supervisors of a realistic schedule; for some banks, 
the adoption date may be beyond year-end 2006 
because of the complexity of the required changes. 
For each bank, the emphasis will be on ''doing it 
right'' rather than on ''doing it quickly,'' and no bank 
would be forced into a regime for which it is not 
ready. Supervisors would, however, expect a formal 
plan and a reasonable implementation date. At any 
time during the transition to adoption, the schedule 
could be slowed or the rules revised if there were a 
good reason to do so. 
SUMMARY. 
The existing capital regime needs to be replaced for 
the large, internationally active banks whose opera-
tions have outgrown the simple paradigm of Basel I 
and whose scale requires improved risk-management 
and supervisory techniques to minimize the risk of 
disruptions to world financial markets. Fortunately, 
the art of risk measurement and management has 
improved dramatically since the first capital accord 
was adopted. The new techniques are the basis for the 
proposed new accord. 
The Basel II framework is the product of extensive 
multiyear dialogues with the banking industry regard-
ing evolving best-practice risk-management tech-
niques in every significant area of banking activity. 
By aligning supervision and regulation with these 
techniques, the proposed new framework represents a 
major step forward in protecting the U.S. financial 
system and those of other nations. Basel II will also 
provide strong incentives for banks to continue 
improving their internal risk-management capabili-
ties and will give supervisors the tools to focus on 
emerging problems and issues more rapidly than is 
now possible. 